

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 043259
ORIGIN EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 SP-02 ACDA-10 SSO-00
DODE-00 IO-06 INR-05 OES-02 NSCE-00 INRE-00 L-01
PA-02 /054 R

DRAFTED BY PM/DCA:JDOBRIN; EUR/WE:JDOBBINS; EUR/RPM:BRECKO
APPROVED BY EUR:GSVEST
PM:JKAHAN
S/P:MR. WILSON
ACDA: MR. FLOWERREE (INFORMED)
NSC:REHUNTER
OSD/ISA:COL KLASS
IO/UNP:MR. BARRY
INR/PMT:MR. BARAZ
EUR:JEGOODBY

-----084488 180230Z /20

O 180126Z FEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 043259

LIMDIS, GENEVA FOR USDEL CCD & WARNKE, BELGRADE FORUSDELCSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, FR, PARM

SUBJECT: FRENCH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES

REFS:

A) PARIS 3501 (NOTAL)
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 043259

B) PARIS 3875 (NOTAL)
C) PARIS 2369 (NOTAL)

1. FRENCH MINISTER-COUNSELOR BOYER CAME IN FEBRUARY 17
AT HIS REQUEST TO GET INITIAL USG REACTIONS TO
PRESIDENT GISCARD'S DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES OF
JANUARY 25. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS (EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY GOODBY AND PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR KAHAN) TOLD BOYER
WE WELCOMED THE INITIATIVES AS INDICATIONS OF A MORE

ACTIVE FRENCH ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL. WE LOOK FORWARD TO EXCHANGING IDEAS WITH THE FRENCH AS THEIR INITIATIVES TAKE MORE SPECIFIC FORM. IN THE MEANTIME, WE COULD OFFER SOME PRELIMINARY, TENTATIVE REACTIONS TO THE INITIATIVES AS OUTLINED JANUARY 25 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY ELABORATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD. WE DREW ON THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 4 BELOW.

2. FOR PARIS: YOU SHOULD DRAW UPON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN DISCUSSION WITH THE GOF, CAREFULLY CAVEATING RESPONSES AS PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, A MORE ACTIVE FRENCH ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IS SOMETHING WHICH EVERY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT FOR TWO DECADES. WE HAVE A CLEAR INTEREST IN IDENTIFYING AREAS OF SHARED US AND FRENCH INTERESTS. THE FRENCH ARE NATURALLY TRYING TO SHAPE THE TERMS OF THEIR PARTICIPATION TO THEIR OWN LIKING AND IN LINE WITH MANY OF THEIR LONG-MAINTAINED CONCERNS AND POSITIONS. BY INDICATING TO THE FRENCH AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONVERGENCY OF VIEWS AS WELL AS ASPECTS OF THEIR PROPOSALS WITH WHICH WE HAVE PROBLEMS, WE HOPE TO SHAPE CERTAIN OF THE FRENCH PORPOSALS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTEREST. WE WISH AS A FIRST STEP TO BEGIN
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 043259

TO SENSITIZE THE GOF TO CERTAIN OF OUR CONCERNS, AND DRAW IT OUT ON THE FRENCH PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES RAISED BY THE MARCH 12-19 FRENCH ELECTIONS, WE BELIEVE IT UNDESIRABLE FOR THE USG TO ATTEMPT TO REACT IN ANY DETAIL TO FRENCH PROPOSALS UNTIL THAT PERIOD IS OVER.

3. FOR GENEVA, USUN, USDEL CSCE, AND USNATO: SUBJECT OF FRENCH INITIATIVES HAS ALREADY COME UP IN NEW YORK, GENEVA AND BELGRADE. WE CANNOT AVOID EXCHANGES ON THE FRENCH PROPOSALS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, BUT FOR THE PRESENT, SHOULD LIMIT SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO RESPONDING WITH PRELIMINARY VIEWS. YOU MAY THUS DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS. IF THE FRENCH FOLLOW THROUGH IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH THEIR INTENTION OF SENDING AN EXPERT TO DISCUSS THE GISCARD INITIATIVES IN NATO (USNATO 1552) USNATO SHOULD ALSO DRAW UPON THESE TALKING POINTS. WE MAY, HOWEVER, WISH TO TAILOR GUIDANCE MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE NATO FORUM.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

THE FRENCH HAVE OFFERED PROPOSALS ON THREE DIFFERENT LEVELS -- GLOBAL, THOSE RELATING TO "NUCLEAR FREE" REGIONS AND THOSE RELATING TO REGIONS ALREADY HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE ARE SUMMARIZED AND OUR PRELIMINARY

VIEWS ON THEM ARE SET FORTH BELOW.

A. CREATION OF A NEW DISARMAMENT BODY WITH DIFFERENT MEMBERSHIP AND PROCEDURES TO REPLACE THE CCD: THE GOF

HAS LONG CRITICIZED THE CCD AS OVER-REPRESENTING THE EASTERN BLOC. IT HAS ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE US - SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS AN UNACCEPTABLE SYMBOL OF SUPER-POWER DOMINATION. IT HAS NOW PROPOSED A NEW
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 043259

MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING BODY ATTACHED TO THE UN TO REPLACE THE CCD. THE GOF PROPOSAL MAY RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT, IN VIEW OF NON-ALIGNED PROPOSALS WHICH ENVISAGE SOMEWHAT SIMILAR MODIFICATION OF THE CCD.

-- WHILE WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT A NEW BODY WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE CCD GIVEN PROBLEMS OF POLITICIZATION AND PROCEDURES, WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS TO THE CCD STRUCTURE, INCLUDING ABOLITION OF THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. WE COULD ALSO CONSIDER A LIMITED EXPANSION OF ITS PRESENT MEMBERSHIP.

-- WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH OTHER NATIONS INCLUDING THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO COORDINATE OUR POSITIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON THIS ISSUE.

B. CREATION OF A WORLD AGENCY TO MANAGE SATELLITE VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES: THERE WOULD SEEM TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO SUCH PROPOSAL, EITHER AN ARRANGEMENT TO PERMIT THE USE BY THE UNITED NATIONS OR SOME RELATED ORGANIZATION OF SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED BY THE US/USSR (OR EVENTUALLY BY OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE) OR ALTERNATIVELY AN AGENCY WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY ORBIT ITS OWN SATELLITES. BOTH POSSIBILITIES RAISE SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE US.

-- IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT THE USSR WOULD COOPERATE; THIS MIGHT WELL LEAD TO PARIS LOOKING TO THE USG FOR THE REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY;

-- EVEN IF THE US WERE TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 043259

SATELLITES, PHOTOGRAPHY AND/OR OTHER INTELLIGENCE, THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHHELD. WERE THE NEW AGENCY TO RELY ON LESS EFFICIENT SATELLITES PROVIDED BY OTHERS, ITS INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS MIGHT

WELL DIFFER FROM OURS, PRESENTING US WITH THE BURDEN OF PROVING OR DISPROVING ITS ASSERTIONS AT THE RISK OF REVEALING SOURCES AND METHODS PROVIDED BY OUR SATELLITES AND OTHER MONITORING SYSTEMS.

-. "ANY US SATELLITE SYSTEM WOULD BY ITSELF BE INCOMPLETE, SINCE SATELLITES ARE JUST ONE ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION. BOTH ANALYSIS AND OTHER CAPABILITIES ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE AN ADEQUATE VERIFICATION -- AS OPPOSED TO MONITORING -- SYSTEM; ALSO, HARDWARE DOES NOT VERIFY - IT MONITORS. INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS MUST BE MADE BY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE. WHERE WOULD THE NEW AGENCY ACQUIRE SUCH EXPERTS AND HOW WOULD IT SETTLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERTS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES?

-- WHAT WOULD BE THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ATTEMPTING TO MAKE INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS ON CASES INVOLVING VARIOUS CONFRONTATIONAL STATES?

-- THE USG WOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE ANY STEP WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE ACCEPTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

C. GLOBAL -CREATION OF A SPECIAL FUND TO MAKE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SAVINGS FROM DISARMAMENT/THE "TAXING" OF OVER-ARMAMENT: THE GOF PROPOSAL IS IN LINE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED INSISTENCE ON THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE A LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. THIS LINK IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF THE MAIN THEMES OF THE SSOD.

-- THE GOF HAS TOLD US THAT "TAX" WAS NOT MEANT IN THE LITERAL SENSE. NEVERTHELESS THIS PROPOSAL WOULD SEEM SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 043259

DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. WHAT STATE, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD LET ANOTHER JUDGE IF IT IS OVERARMED?

-- WE DO NOT ACCEPT AN AUTOMATIC LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE HOWEVER ALREADY AGREED TO A NORDIC INITIATIVE TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM.

D. PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE GOF HAS STATED THAT IT WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. FRANCE WILL ALSO LOOK POSITIVELY AT THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES AND WILL CONSIDER UNDERTAKING SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO THAT END.

-- WE SEE IN THIS GOF POLICY A POSITIVE SIGN OF FRENCH COOPERATION IN NON-PROLIFERATION;

-- SUCH A GOF POLICY COULD LEAD TO FRANCE ADHERING TO PROTOCOL I OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE AND TO SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH NEW ZONES ELSEWHERE, WHICH WE VIEW AS CONSTRUCTIVE.

E. SLOWING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE: FRANCE HAS PROPOSED REGIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS AND INDICATED THAT IT WILL DO ITS PART PROVIDED THAT THERE IS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT IN A GIVEN AREA TO SLOW THE ARMS RACE AND THAT NO DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN SUPPLIERS.

-- AS A PUBLIC SIGN OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE GOAL OF ARMS TRANSFERS RESTRAINTS, THIS PROPOSAL PROVIDES A BASIS FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE.

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 043259

-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN HOW, SPECIFICALLY. THE GOF BELIEVES WE MIGHT MOVE TOWARD SUCH REGIONAL RESTRAINTS.

F. REGIONS ALREADY HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GOF CRITICIZES THE OVERABUNDANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSED BY THE US AND USSR, THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE, AND THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THE GOF STATES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SALT PROCESS, BUT BELIEVES THAT BOTH THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR STOCKPILES. THE GOF NOTES THAT EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CANNOT BE LIMITED TO CENTRAL EUROPE (MBFR). THIS GOF PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH LONG-STANDING FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO THE "SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ZONE" CREATED BY MBFR AND THE BLOC-TO-BLOC CHARTER OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT PARALLELS IN PART THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WITHIN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT HOWEVER, BE PLEASED AT THE INCLUSION OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE GOF PROPOSES A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT COMPOSED OF ALL THE CSCE COUNTRIES PLUS ALBANIA TO ADDRESS CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, THE COMPETENCE OF THIS CONFERENCE TO BE THE AREA BOUNDED BY THE URALS AND THE ATLANTIC.

-- WE DOUBT THAT ANY FORUM OF THIS SIZE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

-- WHAT SORT OF ISSUES WOULD FRANCE FORESEE THIS NEW FORUM DISCUSSING?

VANCE

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 043259
ORIGIN SS-05

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 SSO-00 /009 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O MCEURVORST
APPROVED BY: S/S- O MCEURVORST
PM: P HAYES

-----101649 192028Z /42

O 191950Z FEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 043259

LIMDIS FOR LESLIE GELB

PLEASE GIVE TO GELB UPON RECEIPT

FOL TEL SENT ACTION PARIS USUN NEW YORK BELGRADE GENEVA
USNATO FROM SECSTATE DTD 18 FEB 1978 QTE

S E C R E T STATE 043259

LIMDIS, GENEVA FOR USDEL CCD & WARNKE, BELGRADE FORUSDELCSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, FR, PARM

SUBJECT: FRENCH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES

REFS:

- A) PARIS 3501 (NOTAL)
- B) PARIS 3875 (NOTAL)
- C) PARIS 2369 (NOTAL)

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 043259

1. FRENCH MINISTER-COUNSELOR BOYER CAME IN FEBRUARY 17
AT HIS REQUEST TO GET INITIAL USG REACTIONS TO
PRESIDENT GISCARD'S DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES OF
JANUARY 25. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS (EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY GOODBY AND PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR KAHAN) TOLD BOYER
WE WELCOMED THE INITIATIVES AS INDICATIONS OF A MORE

ACTIVE FRENCH ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL. WE LOOK FORWARD TO
EXCHANGING IDEAS WITH THE FRENCH AS THEIR INITIATIVES
TAKE MORE SPECIFIC FORM. IN THE MEANTIME, WE COULD OFFER

SOME PRELIMINARY, TENTATIVE REACTIONS TO THE INITIATIVES AS OUTLINED JANUARY 25 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY ELABORATED BY FOREIGN MINISTER DE GUIRINGAUD. WE DREW ON THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 4 BELOW.

2. FOR PARIS: YOU SHOULD DRAW UPON FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS IN DISCUSSION WITH THE GOF, CAREFULLY CAVEATING RESPONSES AS PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, A MORE ACTIVE FRENCH ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IS SOMETHING WHICH EVERY AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SOUGHT FOR TWO DECADES. WE HAVE A CLEAR INTEREST IN IDENTIFYING AREAS OF SHARED US AND FRENCH INTERESTS. THE FRENCH ARE NATURALLY TRYING TO SHAPE THE TERMS OF THEIR PARTICIPATION TO THEIR OWN LIKING AND IN LINE WITH MANY OF THEIR LONG-MAINTAINED CONCERNS AND POSITIONS. BY INDICATING TO THE FRENCH AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONVERGENCY OF VIEWS AS WELL AS ASPECTS OF THEIR PROPOSALS WITH WHICH WE HAVE PROBLEMS, WE HOPE TO SHAPE CERTAIN OF THE FRENCH PORPOSALS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTEREST. WE WISH AS A FIRST STEP TO BEGIN TO SENSITIZE THE GOF TO CERTAIN OF OUR CONCERNS, AND DRAW IT OUT ON THE FRENCH PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES RAISED BY THE
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 043259

MARCH 12-19 FRENCH ELECTIONS, WE BELIEVE IT UNDESIRABLE FOR THE USG TO ATTEMPT TO REACT IN ANY DETAIL TO FRENCH PROPOSALS UNTIL THAT PERIOD IS OVER.

3. FOR GENEVA, USUN, USDEL CSCE, AND USNATO: SUBJECT OF FRENCH INITIATIVES HAS ALREADY COME UP IN NEW YORK, GENEVA AND BELGRADE. WE CANNOT AVOID EXCHANGES ON THE FRENCH PROPOSALS WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, BUT FOR THE PRESENT, SHOULD LIMIT SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO RESPONDING WITH PRELIMINARY VIEWS. YOU MAY THUS DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ON AN IF-ASKED BASIS. IF THE FRENCH FOLLOW THROUGH IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH THEIR INTENTION OF SENDING AN EXPERT TO DISCUSS THE GISCARD INITIATIVES IN NATO (USNATO 1552) USNATO SHOULD ALSO DRAW UPON THESE TALKING POINTS. WE MAY, HOWEVER, WISH TO TAILOR GUIDANCE MORE SPECIFICALLY TO THE NATO FORUM.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

THE FRENCH HAVE OFFERED PROPOSALS ON THREE DIFFERENT LEVELS -- GLOBAL, THOSE RELATING TO "NUCLEAR FREE" REGIONS AND THOSE RELATING TO REGIONS ALREADY HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE ARE SUMMARIZED AND OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THEM ARE SET FORTH BELOW.

A. CREATION OF A NEW DISARMAMENT BODY WITH DIFFERENT

MEMBERSHIP AND PROCEDURES TO REPLACE THE CCD: THE GOF

HAS LONG CRITICIZED THE CCD AS OVER-REPRESENTING THE EASTERN BLOC. IT HAS ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE US - SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS AN UNACCEPTABLE SYMBOL OF SUPER-POWER DOMINATION. IT HAS NOW PROPOSED A NEW MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING BODY ATTACHED TO THE UN TO REPLACE THE CCD. THE GOF PROPOSAL MAY RECEIVE SUBSTANTIAL NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT, IN VIEW OF NON-SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 043259

ALIGNED PROPOSALS WHICH ENVISAGE SOMEWHAT SIMILAR MODIFICATION OF THE CCD.

-- WHILE WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT A NEW BODY WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE CCD GIVEN PROBLEMS OF POLITICIZATION AND PROCEDURES, WE HAVE MADE KNOWN OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS TO THE CCD STRUCTURE, INCLUDING ABOLITION OF THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. WE COULD ALSO CONSIDER A LIMITED EXPANSION OF ITS PRESENT MEMBERSHIP.

-- WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH OTHER NATIONS INCLUDING THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO COORDINATE OUR POSITIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON THIS ISSUE.

B. CREATION OF A WORLD AGENCY TO MANAGE SATELLITE VERIFICATION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES: THERE WOULD SEEM TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO SUCH PROPOSAL, EITHER AN ARRANGEMENT TO PERMIT THE USE BY THE UNITED NATIONS OR SOME RELATED ORGANIZATION OF SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED BY THE US/USSR (OR EVENTUALLY BY OTHER NATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE) OR ALTERNATIVELY AN AGENCY WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY ORBIT ITS OWN SATELLITES. BOTH POSSIBILITIES RAISE SERIOUS ISSUES FOR THE US.

-- IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT THE USSR WOULD COOPERATE; THIS MIGHT WELL LEAD TO PARIS LOOKING TO THE USG FOR THE REQUIRED TECHNOLOGY;

-- EVEN IF THE US WERE TO CONSIDER CONTRIBUTING SATELLITES, PHOTOGRAPHY AND/OR OTHER INTELLIGENCE, THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHHELD. WERE THE NEW AGENCY TO RELY ON LESS EFFICIENT SATELLITES SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 043259

PROVIDED BY OTHERS, ITS INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS MIGHT WELL DIFFER FROM OURS, PRESENTING US WITH THE BURDEN OF PROVING OR DISPROVING ITS ASSERTIONS AT THE RISK OF REVEALING SOURCES AND METHODS PROVIDED BY OUR

SATELLITES AND OTHER MONITORING SYSTEMS.

A. "ANY US SATELLITE SYSTEM WOULD BY ITSELF BE INCOMPLETE, SINCE SATELLITES ARE JUST ONE ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION. BOTH ANALYSIS AND OTHER CAPABILITIES ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE AN ADEQUATE VERIFICATION -- AS OPPOSED TO MONITORING -- SYSTEM; ALSO, HARDWARE DOES NOT VERIFY - IT MONITORS. INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS MUST BE MADE BY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE. WHERE WOULD THE NEW AGENCY ACQUIRE SUCH EXPERTS AND HOW WOULD IT SETTLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERTS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES?

-- WHAT WOULD BE THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ATTEMPTING TO MAKE INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS ON CASES INVOLVING VARIOUS CONFRONTATIONAL STATES?

-- THE USG WOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE ANY STEP WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE ACCEPTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

C. GLOBAL -CREATION OF A SPECIAL FUND TO MAKE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SAVINGS FROM DISARMAMENT/THE "TAXING" OF OVER-ARMAMENT: THE GOF PROPOSAL IS IN LINE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED INSISTENCE ON THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE A LINK BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. THIS LINK IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF THE MAIN THEMES OF THE SSOD.

-- THE GOF HAS TOLD US THAT "TAX" WAS NOT MEANT IN THE LITERAL SENSE. NEVERTHELESS THIS PROPOSAL WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. WHAT STATE, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD LET ANOTHER JUDGE IF IT IS OVERARMED?

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 043259

-- WE DO NOT ACCEPT AN AUTOMATIC LINKAGE BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE HOWEVER ALREADY AGREED TO A NORDIC INITIATIVE TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM.

D. PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE GOF HAS STATED THAT IT WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT EFFORTS AIMED AT PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. FRANCE WILL ALSO LOOK POSITIVELY AT THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES AND WILL CONSIDER UNDERTAKING SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS TO THAT END.

-- WE SEE IN THIS GOF POLICY A POSITIVE SIGN OF FRENCH COOPERATION IN NON-PROLIFERATION;

-- SUCH A GOF POLICY COULD LEAD TO FRANCE ADHERING TO PROTOCOL I OF THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

AND TO SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH NEW ZONES ELSEWHERE, WHICH WE VIEW AS CONSTRUCTIVE.

E. SLOWING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE: FRANCE HAS PROPOSED REGIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS AND INDICATED THAT IT WILL DO ITS PART PROVIDED THAT THERE IS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT IN A GIVEN AREA TO SLOW THE ARMS RACE AND THAT NO DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN SUPPLIERS.

-- AS A PUBLIC SIGN OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE GOAL OF ARMS TRANSFERS RESTRAINTS, THIS PROPOSAL PROVIDES A BASIS FOR CONTINUED DIALOGUE.

-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN HOW, SPECIFICALLY. THE GOF BELIEVES WE MIGHT MOVE TOWARD SUCH REGIONAL RESTRAINTS.

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 043259

F. REGIONS ALREADY HAVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE GOF CRITICIZES THE OVERABUNDANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSED BY THE US AND USSR, THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE, AND THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THE GOF STATES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SALT PROCESS, BUT BELIEVES THAT BOTH THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR STOCKPILES. THE GOF NOTES THAT EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CANNOT BE LIMITED TO CENTRAL EUROPE (MBFR). THIS GOF PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH LONG-STANDING FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO THE "SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ZONE" CREATED BY MBFR AND THE BLOC-TO-BLOC CHARTER OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT PARALLELS IN PART THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WITHIN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT HOWEVER, BE PLEASED AT THE INCLUSION OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE GOF PROPOSES A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT COMPOSED OF ALL THE CSCE COUNTRIES PLUS ALBANIA TO ADDRESS CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, THE COMPETENCE OF THIS CONFERENCE TO BE THE AREA BOUNDED BY THE URALS AND THE ATLANTIC.

-- WE DOUBT THAT ANY FORUM OF THIS SIZE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

-- WHAT SORT OF ISSUES WOULD FRANCE FORESEE THIS NEW FORUM DISCUSSING?
VANCE UNQTE VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE043259
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PM/DCA:JDOBRIN; EUR/WE:JDOBBINS; EUR/RPM:BRECKO
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780075-0074
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197802120/baaafbws.tel
Line Count: 538
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 9c9eb5cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) PARIS 3501 (NOTAL)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3475837
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRENCH DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES
TAGS: PARM, FR, NATO
To: PARIS USUN N Y MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9c9eb5cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014